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Abstrat
Close examination of wealth distributions reveal the existene of two distint power
law regimes. The Pareto exponents of the super-rih, identied for example in rih
lists suh as provided by Forbes are smaller than the Pareto exponents obtained for
top earners in inome data sets. Our extension of the Slanina model of wealth is
able to reprodue these double power law features.
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1 Introdution
The rst person to study the topi of wealth distributions in a quantitative
manner, Pareto, was trained as an engineer [1℄. In reent years, it is the physis
ommunity who have made signiant ontributions to the topi, again by
fousing not only on theoretial methodologies [2,3,4,5,6℄ but also making
omparisons of their results with empirial data [7,8,9,10,11℄. For a reent
detailed review of the subjet see [12℄.
What does seem lear from the mounting evidene is that inome and wealth
distributions aross soieties everywhere follow a robust pattern and that the
appliation of ideas from statistial physis an provide understanding that
omplements the observed data. The distribution rises from very low values
for low inome earners to a peak before falling away again at high inomes. For
very high inomes it takes the form of a power law as rst noted by Pareto.
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The distribution is ertainly not uniform. Many people are poor and few are
rih.
The umulative probability orresponds to the probability of nding earners
that have an inome bigger or equal to a ertain amount of inome, m. For
values ofm less than the average inome it dereases slowly from its maximum
value 1. For values roughly high than the average it follows a power law:
P (>m) = m
−α
(1)
where α is the Pareto exponent.
Looking losely at results for inome and wealth distributions around the
world (Table 5.2 in referene [12℄) we see that the values for the exponents for
wealth/inome data sets, and data that onerns only the top wealthiest people
in soiety dier. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the Pareto exponents when
we take these dierent origins of the data into aount. The average Pareto
exponent is approximately 2.0 for the top earners in tax/inheritane statistis,
and just below 1.0 for the super-rih.
Figure 1. Distribution of the Pareto exponents found by dierent authors in the last
deade. The blak urve is from data sets taken from tax/inome databases. The
grey urve is from super-rih lists, suh as Forbes. The Pareto exponent for the top
rihest is around 1 while for the normal rih people is around 2 (data taken from
Table 5.2 in referene [12℄).
We believe that the studies of wealth that are based on tax/inome generally
do not inlude the wealth of very rih people. A further indiation of two
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power law regimes is the study of Souma [7℄. In Figure 1 of his paper [7℄,
Souma found a Pareto exponent of 2.06 in the high end. However, we see an
indiation of a seond power law for the top rihest (higher than 3000 million
yen) whih we estimate as an exponent below 1.0 based on his gure. Yet a
further indiation of two power laws omes from our analysis of U.K. data.
In Figure 2 we show data for the umulative distribution of inomes in the
UK for the year 1995. The upper urve is alulated from survey data and
tends to a power law whih was onrmed by data obtained by Cranshaw
[13℄ from the UK Revenue Commissioners. The lower urve is alulated using
the U.K. New Inome Survey data, whih takes a 1% sample of all employees
in Great-Britain. The slight shift in the two urves is due to unertainty in a
normalisation fator but the power law is learly seen and extends from weekly
inomes of just under £1000 per week up to around £30000 per week. Over
this region the Pareto exponent is ∼ 3.3. This might be assumed to be the end
of the story with the power law being assoiated with Pareto's law. However
from data published by Sunday Times [14℄ for the wealth of billionaires in
U.K. for 2006, we an make an estimate of the inome in 1995 generated by
the wealth. In order to move from 2006 bak to 1995, we made some reative
estimations. First, we said that probably the wealth of the top rihest group
had inreased in proportion to the stok market over the period 1995 to 2006.
This index has roughly doubled in that time, so in 1995, the wealth is roughly
50% of the 2006 value. Then we assumed this wealth generated an inome
from being invested and the interest rate was around 4% per annum. This
yields a seond power law with Pareto exponent ∼ 1.26. This suggests what
many people believe to be true, namely that the super wealthy pay less tax
as a proportion of their inome than the majority of earners in soiety!
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Figure 2. Distribution of the umulative weekly inome in U.K. for 1995. The left
side urves represent inome for 1995 from two dierent soures and a similar Pareto
exponent is ahieved for the high end of these urves, ∼ 3.2 − 3.3. The right side
urve represent an estimation of the inome, in 1995, for the top rihest in U.K. In
this ase the Pareto exponent is lower and around 1.3.
2 Wealth models
A number of models have been proposed to aount for the distributions of
wealth in soiety. One lass that might be onsidered to onstitute a meso-
sopi approah is based on a generalised Lotka Volterra models [2,15,16℄.
Other mirosopi models invoke agents that exhange money via pairwise
transations aording to a spei exhange rule. The results from these lat-
ter models depend ritially on the nature of the exhange proess. Two quite
dierent exhange proesses have been postulated. The rst by Chakraborti
and olleagues [17,18℄ onserves money during the exhange and allows sav-
ings that an be a xed and equal perentage of the initial money held by eah
agent. This yields the Boltzmann distribution. Allowing the saving perentage
to take on a random harater then introdues a power law harater to the
distribution for high inomes. The value of the power law exponent however
an be shown to be exatly one [4℄. Only a slight variation of the exponent is
ahieved by attributing memory to the agents [11℄.
On the other hand, the model of Slanina [19℄ assumes a dierent exhange
4
rule. It also allows reation of money during eah exhange proess and the
solution is not stationary. One must normalise the amount of money held by
an agent with the mean value of money within the system at time t. In this
way a stationary solution for the distribution of the normalised money an be
obtained. Suh a proedure must also be applied to obtain a solution from the
Lotka Volterra approah and it is interesting to see that the nal results for
both methods yield distribution funtions of the same form. Detailed numerial
omparisons with the data suggest that this form gives a good t to the data
below the super rih region [12℄.
3 Expansion of Slanina's model
Slanina's model [19℄ involves the pairwise interation of agents, whih at every
exhange proess also reeive some money from outside. The time evolution
of trades is represented as:


vi(t+ 1)
vj(t+ 1)

 =


1 + ǫ− β β
β 1 + ǫ− β




vi(t)
vj(t)

 (2)
where vi(t) is the wealth of agent i at time t (i = 1, . . . , N , where N is the total
number of agents), β quanties the perentage of wealth exhanged between
agents and ǫ measures the quantity of wealth injeted in the system at every
exhange. In the simplest ase, the values of β and ǫ are kept onstant for
all trades. This results in a power law for the rih end at the normalised
distribution of wealth, i.e. the distribution of xi(t) = vi(t)/v¯(t) where v¯(t) is
the mean wealth at time t (v¯(t) =
∑N
i=1 vi(t)/N). An approximation of the
Pareto exponent is given by Slanina paper [19℄ as:
α ∼
2β
ǫ2
+ 1 (3)
apart from some orretion in the ǫ term. To hek the auray of this ap-
proximation, we ran some simulations for 104 agents trading 103 × N times
and averaged over 103 realisations. The perentage of wealth exhanged (β)
was set to 0.005 and the perentage of wealth injeted in the system (ǫ) to 0.1.
Fitting a power law to the high end of our distribution in Figure 3, we nd
an exponent of 2.0 in exellent agreement with the value of 2.0 of equation 3
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Figure 3. Cumulative distribution of wealth in a simple Slanina model, for 104 agents
trading 103 ×N times and averaged over 103 realisations. The perentage of wealth
exhanged (β) is equal 0.005 and the perentage of wealth injeted in the system (ǫ)
is 0.1. The Pareto exponent for the higher end is ∼ 2.0.
Our expansion of Slanina's model is given by making β a funtion of v, β(v).
The main onlusion that we an take from this wealth dynami is that a
double power law arrives from the dierene between the perentage of money
that agents put in the soiety for trade. This dierene an be related with
dierent levels of fear to risk or from some eonomial issues related with
taxation. This results in the following update rule:


vi(t+ 1)
vj(t+ 1)

 =


1 + ǫ− β(vi) β(vj)
β(vi) 1 + ǫ− β(vj)




vi(t)
vj(t)

 . (4)
Here we onsider the simplest ase, i.e.:
β(v) =


β1, v < nv¯(t)
β2, v ≥ nv¯(t)
, β1 > β2 (5)
If an agent has wealth higher than a threshold (n times the average wealth,
v¯(t)), the seond parameter (β2) will be used. The threshold adopted in these
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simulations is 10v¯(t), so if agent i or j have a mean wealth higher than this
threshold they will trade a dierent perentage as if they would have a smaller
amount.
To simulate a soiety like the U.K., where two Pareto exponents exist, one for
the top earners around 3.0 and another one for the super-rih around 1.5, we
have hosen the parameters β and α aording to equation 3, i.e. β1 = 0.01,
β2 = 0.00125 and ǫ = 0.1. Figure 4 shows the result of our simulations. Two
distint power laws are visible, one in the regime between v¯(t) and 10v¯(t) and
another one for wealth larger than 10v¯(t). The Pareto exponents are 2.51 and
1.29, respetively, and thus dier from the predition of equation 3. However
in our ase, this predition should only be taken as a rst order approximation,
sine we are essentially dealing with two soieties (eah speied by its respe-
tive β values) whih are interating. Agents swith between their interation
parameters aording to their relative wealth.
The main suess of the modied Slanina model is thus the reprodution of
two power laws regimes. Contrary to this, and to some surprise, alulations
based on a similarly modied Lotka Volterra model did not result in suh
double power law distribution.
7
0.0001 0.01 1 100 10000
normalised wealth, x = v / v
1e-05
0.0001
0.001
0.01
0.1
1
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
D
ist
rib
ut
io
n 
( x
 )
~ 2.51
~ 1.29
Figure 4. Cumulative distribution of wealth in expanded Slanina model. The values
for number of agents, time steps, realisations and perentage of wealth injeted in
the system (ǫ) are the same as used in Figure 3. The perentage of wealth exhanged
(β) if the agent has wealth smaller than 10v¯(t) is 0.01 0.00125 and if the agent has
wealth higher or equal to 10v¯(t) is 0.00125. Two dierent Pareto exponents appear
in dierent parts of the distribution. One for what we all rih people is around
∼ 2.5 and a seond one for the top rihest is around ∼ 1.3. The vertial dashed line
shows the threshold that we hoose for dierent β's values.
A better auray of the theoretial results should be ahieved in future work,
where we intend to nd the solution for the ase of two Pareto exponents in
the same wealth distribution.
4 Conlusion
As was disussed in [12℄, progress in understanding the details of wealth dis-
tribution is invariably linked to obtaining data sets that enompass the entire
population of a ountry. It appears that at present, this information is only
available for a few ountries, for example Japan (Souma [7℄). Generally, the
super-rih are not inluded in inome data. Published wealth lists are esti-
mates, but for the moment might well remain the only publi soure for the
information on these top earners. We hope that analyses of the kind we have
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made in this paper enourages the release of more detailed inome data over
the entire inome range. Only with more omplete data sets will we be able
to properly understand these omplex eonomi systems.
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